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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS A. NELSON, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. No. 15659 
MICHELLE MARION DAVIS, 
et al., 
Defendant-Appellants 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff-
respondent for a determination of the property rights 
of plaintiff-respondent and defendant-appellants to 
property previously held in joint tenancy by plaintiff-
respondent and defendant-appellants' decedent. 
DISPOSITION BELOH 
This case was heard by the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, and resulted in a judgment in favor of plaintiff-
respondent and against defendant-appellants, holding 
that plaintiff-respondent was the sole legal owner of a 
horne located at 3061 Canyon View Circle, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Defendant-appellants were declared to have no 
interest in and to said property, and any instruments 
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under which they purportedly claimed an interest were 
declared of no legal effect and void. It was also held 
that plaintiff-respondent was entitled to immediate 
possession of said property. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent requests that the 
Supreme Court affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Sixteen years before the present litigation 
began, plaintiff-respondent acquired a home at 3061 
Canyon View Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, with his first 
wife who is now deceased. The home was paid for from 
the earnings of plaintiff-respondent since its purchase, 
and upon the death of the first wife the joint tenancy 
was dissolved, and plaintiff-respondent became the sole 
owner of the property (R.P. 110-111). 
On ~~rch 11, 1976, plaintiff-respondent married 
defendant-appellants' decedent, Betty N. Nelson. Defen-
dant-appellants' decedent shortly thereafter prevailed 
upon plaintiff-respondent to make her a joint tenant 
of the home located at 3061 Canyon View Circle (R.P. 111, 
1.3-11). Defendant-appellants' decedent refused to go on 
vacation with plaintiff-respondent until she was made a 
joint tenant (R.P. 118, 1.16-20). Upon her continued 
insistance (R.P. 117, l. 21-22), plaintiff-respondent as 
grantor quit-claimed the home to himself and defendant-
appellants' decedent as joint tenants on May 13, 1976. 
Defendant-appellants' decedent did not pay anything for 
the home (R.P. 115, 1.12-14). 
As soon as defendant-appellants' decedent had 
induced plaintiff-respondent to make her a joint tenant, 
the marital relationship deteriorated rapidly (R.P. 118). 
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In late May or June of 1976 plaintiff-respondent contacted 
his attorney regarding a divorce (R.P. 118, 1.24-25). 
In July, 1976, plaintiff-respondent decided to go ahead 
with the divorce, but defendant-appellants' decedent talked 
him out of it (R.P. 118, 1.25-28). Plaintiff-respondent 
had considered divorce before he was aware that defendant-
appellants' decedent had terminal cancer (R.P. 118, 1.27-29). 
His reason for filing the divorce had nothing to do with 
her illness (R.P. 119, 1.1-2). The divorce was commenced 
in September, 1976, and the Complaint was filed on October 
4, 1976, less than six months after plaintiff-respondent 
and defendant-appellants' decedent were married. 
On October 22, 1976, a hearin~ was held on 
defendant-appellants' decedent's Order to Show Cause 
(R.P. 175). At that hearing, counsel for defendant-
appellants' decedent argued for an order that no fixed 
assets of the parties be allowed to be disposed of or 
encumbered: 
Mr King: My only oplnlon is that one 
of the orders of the Court should be that 
no fixed assets should be disposed of 
or encumbered. 
The Court: I'm not going to decide 
who has what assets at this time. 
Mx. King: I think it would be proper 
for the Court to enter an order saying 
in this case the assets in either 
party's name or the name of her 
children not be disposed of but be held 
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in tact until the Court can take a 
look at the whole thing. (Exhibit 
P-2, P.5-6) 
Based upon the hearing of October 22, 1976, 
defendant-appellants' decedent was under court order 
not to convey the property in question to any third 
party (R.P 179). In spite of the argument of decedent's 
counsel and in violation of the court's Order, on November 
3, 1976, the decedent had a deed prepared that conveyed 
the property in question to defendant-appellant Michelle 
Marion Davis (Exhibit D-5). This conveyance was ?repared 
by the attorney for defendant-appellants' decedent during 
the interim between the hearing and his preparation of the 
Order for the court's signature. On the same day, decedent 
had a document drafted entitled "Notice of Termination 
of Joint Tenancy," that was recorded on ~ovember 4, 1976, 
(Exhibit D-6). Plaintiff-respondent did not give his 
consent to the decedent to terminate the joint tenancy 
(R.P. 111, 1.26-30). By this "Notice of Termination," 
decedent attempted to unilaterally destroy the joint 
tenancy in the home of which she had induced plaintiff-
respondent to make her a joint tenant only six months 
earlier and of which she had paid nothing for. The pur-
ported notice of termination of joint tenancy did not 
terminate the joint tenancy (R. P. 76, paragraph 5). 
During the divorce oroceedings, decedent died 
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on May 24, 1977. On June 2, 1977, plaintiff-respondent 
filed an Affidavit of Identity with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office (Exhibit P-4). indicating that the deceased 
Betty N. Nelson was one of the grantees of the Quit£laim Deed 
creating the joint tenancy between plaintiff-respondent 
and Betty N. Nelson. By the recordation of said Affidavit 
of Identity the said Betty N. Nelson having died, plaintiff-
respondent became the sole and legal owner of the property 
in question (R.P. 76-77, paragraph 7). As the sole and 
legal owner of the property, plaintiff-respondent attempted 
to obtain possession of the premises. Plaintiff-respondent 
was prevented from obtaining possession, however, by the 
refusal of defendant-appellant Michelle Marion Davis to 
leave the premises. Defendant-appellant Michelle Marion 
Davis, a daughter of the decedent, had been living in the 
home at the time of the decedent's death. 
About this same time, the deed dated :~ovember 
3, 1977, from the decedent to defendant-appellant Davis 
was recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office 
on June 3, 1977 (Exhibit D-5), ten days after the decedent's 
death. At ~he trial there was no evidence of the delivery 
of the deed and on that basis the purported conveyance 
was determined to be invalid (R.P. 76, paragraph 4). 
In addition to refusing to leave the oropertv 
of plaintiff-respondent, defendant-appellant Davis neither 
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paid anything for the use of the premises nor took care 
of it. The lawn, shrubbery, and trees were allowed to 
die (Exhibit 1-P). Garbage accumulated in the house and 
yard. Drapes and other items were destroyed or ruined 
(R.P. 113-114). 
After numerous requests by plaintiff-respondent 
to move into his legally owned home and numerous refusals 
by defendant-appellant to let him, plaintiff-respondent 
filed the present action to remove defendant-appellant 
Davis fromhLs property and to recover damages for the 
destruction done. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS' DECEDENT DID NOT AND COULD 
NOT DESTROY THE JOINT TENANCY HITH PLAINTIFF-
RESPONDENT BY RECORDING A NOTICE OF TERMINATION 
OF JOINT TENANCY 
The issue in this case is whether defendant-
appellants' decedent, who induced plaintiff-respondent 
to make her a joint tenant and who did not contribute 
anything to the joint tenancy in question, can uni-
laterally destroy the joint tenancy by the mere act of 
making and recording a Notice of Termination of Joint 
Tenancy. 
Both reason and the authorities dictate that 
defendant-appellants' decedent could not destroy the 
joint tenancy by this means. Indeed, what defendant-
appellants' decedent unsuccessfully attempted was 
neither legally permissible nor equitably proper. 
The cases uniformly hold that absent a legal and valid 
conveyance to a third party during a joint tenant's life-
time, the joint tenancy can only be destroyed by the 
mutual consent of all of the joint tenants. See Carson 
v. Ellis 186 Kan. 112, 348 P.2d 807 (1960); Federal 
National Mortgage Association v. Elliott, 1 Kan.App. 2d 
366, 566 P.2d 21 (1977). 
Since defendant-appellants' decedent was 
restrained from transf~ringthe property to third persons 
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the only way she could destroy the joint tenancy was 
by obtaining the consent of the plaintiff-respondent, 
the other joint tenant. Such consent was never given. 
Faced with the problem of not being able to legally 
terminate the joint tenancy by conveyance or consent, 
defendant-appellants' decedent attempted to terminate it 
by notice. 
The Court of Appeal of California in Clark v. 
Carter, 265 Cal.App.2d 291, 70 Cal.Rptr. 923 (1968), 
dealt with a case similar to the present action. There, 
a wife who held real property in joint tenancy with her 
husband, tried to convey it from herself as joint tenant 
and grantor to herself as a grantee and tenant in common. 
The wife's theory was that since the joint tenancy may 
be created by one sole owner granting to himself and 
another, a joint tenancy should also be terminable by 
a transfer by one joint tenant to himself as a tenant in 
common. The court rejected this theory and held that a 
joint tenancy "could not be terminated by the mere 
expedient of transferring title to one's self." The 
court declared the wife's conveyance void as being in 
derogation of both the common law and California statutory 
law. 
In :1ewrnan v. Youngblood, 394 Ill. 617, 69 N.E. 
2d 309 (1946), the Supreme Court of Illinois decided a 
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case directly in point with the present action. In 
that case, Charles D. Youngblood and May R. Youngblood 
had an attorney prepare joint tenancy deeds to their 
respective properties, both having owned real property 
acquired during prior marriages. The deeds were executed 
and delivered to be held by the attorney who drew them. 
Shortly thereafter the Youngbloods experienced marital 
difficulties and separated. At that time Mrs. Youngblood 
wrote the attorney who drafted the joint tenancy deeds, 
requesting that he consider the deeds void and not record 
them. Mrs. Youngblood thereafter by will attempted to 
distribute the joint tenancy property to other family 
members to the exclusion of her husband, the surviving 
joint tenant. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois in finding that 
the joint tenancy had not been terminated by the unilateral 
declaration of Mrs. Youngblood, held that where the 
husband and wife place their realty in joint tenancy, 
the wife's subsequent change of mind and desire to 
terminate the agreement to place the realty in joint 
tenancy, could only be consumated by the mutual consent 
of both husband and wife. 
It is clear from the above cited cases that 
the unilateral action of defendant-appellants' decedent 
did not terminate the joint tenancy with plaintiff-
10 
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respondent. Since the joint tenancy was not terminated, 
plaintiff-respondent became the sole owner of the property 
in question as the surviving joint tenant. 
II. THE ORDER GRANTING DEFENDA.~T-APPELLANTS' DECEDENT 
THE RIGHT TO CONVERT THE JOINT TENANCY TO TEN&~CY 
IN COMMON, IF THERE WAS SUCH A RIGHT, BECAME A 
NUILITY UNDER DALY 
Prior to the conclusion of the divorce proceed-
ing between defendant-appellants' decedent and plaintiff-
respondent, the decedent died, thereby terminating the 
divorce proceeding and setting at naught orders or the 
like relative to the disposition of the property entered 
in that case. See Daly v. Daly, 533 P.2d 884 (Utah 1975). 
During the lifetime of defendant-appellants' decedent, 
she was under a court order dated October 22, 1976, not 
to convey the property to any third person. She was 
given, however, the right to convert the joint tenancy 
to a tenancy in common. As previously discussed, the 
only way defendant-appellants' decedent could have con-
verted the joint tenancy (since she could not convey it 
to a third party) was to obtain the consent of plaintiff-
respondent. This was never done. 
Even assuming that defendant-appellants' 
decedent had a right to convert the joint tenancy to a 
tenancy in common by some method other than conveyance 
or consent, based upon this Court's reasoning in Daly, 
ll 
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that right died with the decedent. Defendant-appellants' 
brief fails to distinguish the reasoning of the Daly 
case from the present act: ion. 
III. THE DEED FROM DECEDENT TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
DAVIS FAILED TO CONVEY THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION 
SINCE THERE WAS NO DELIVERY DURING DECEDENT'S 
LIFETIME 
The courts have repeatedly held that before a 
deed can operate as a valid transfer of title there must 
be delivery of the instrument and such delivery must 
be effected during the lifetime of the grantor. See 
McLaws v. Casey, 88 Idaho 348, 400 P.2d 386 (1965); 
Newman v. Youngblood, 394 Ill. 617, 69 N.E. 2d 309 
(1946). 
The deed purportedly conveying decedent's 
interest to defendant-appellant Davis was signed on 
November 3, 1976. This was in violation of an order 
restraining the decedent from conveying the property 
in question to any third oarties. The decedent died 
on May 24, 1977, never having delivered the deed to 
defendant-appellant Davis. It was not until June 3, 
1977, that the deed was recorded. 
Since there was no evidence of delivery of 
the deed in which the decedent had purported to convey 
the property in question to defendant-apoellant Davis, 
and since decedent was restrained from making a convey-
12 
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ance, the trial court ruled that the conveyance was 
invalid at the time it was made and therefore set the 
conveyance aside. This ruling was proper and should 
be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision 
of the trial court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Hendell E. Bennett 
13 
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